



b. When it became evident that Soviet harassing measures were in effect intended to blockade access to Berlin the Allies would start mobilizing for a show down.

c. Time purchased by the Berlin stockpile would be used for such mobilization.

d. The use of force to lift the Berlin blockade would be resorted to only when the Allies were mentally prepared to accept general war if the use of force failed.

7. It is believed that an earlier use of force than that recommended by the Planning Board runs the grave risk of plunging the Allies into World War III without availing themselves of the opportunity to improve their war readiness by utilizing the time bought with the Berlin stockpile. It is further believed that neither France, the U.K., nor West Germany would agree to taking such a risk, and that unilateral U.S. action in this case would be impossible.

#### RECOMMENDATION

8. That the policy recommended by the Planning Board be approved rather than that proposed in J.C.S. 1907/101.

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Copy for: Admiral Radford

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